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The Kyoto Protocol2
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is an international agree-
ment on the reduction of anthropogenic emissions of
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)3 concluded at the third
Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in Kyoto, December 1997.4 The KP was
the first step to mitigate the impacts of global cli-
mate change. It expires in 2012. In December 2009
COP 15 will be held in Copenhagen where a long-
term agreement on drastic further reductions is on
the agenda.
At the Kyoto Conference industrialized countries
agreed to reduce GHG emissions by an average of
5.2 percent in CO2 equivalents from 1990 levels by
the commitment period 2008-2012. The KP reduc-
tion targets were differentiated by country and
ranged from an increase of 8 percent for Australia, to
decreases ranging from 0 for the Russian Federation,
6 percent for Japan and Canada, 7 percent for the
United States and 8 percent for the EU. The ratio-
nale for differentiated reductions was that the bur-
den of limiting GHG emissions should be equally
shared (Fisher et al. 1998).
Under the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and recognizing that industrialized
countries are responsible for the current levels of
GHGs in the atmosphere in the first place (see
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php),
Non-Annex I Parties (i.e. developing country mem-
bers of the UNFCCC) were only obliged to periodi-
cally update their national inventories of GHG emis-
sions and of removals by sinks – i.e. natural or man-
made systems that absorb and store more GHG than
they emit, for example, forests (see van Kooten and
Sohngen (2009) for details). However, developing
countries were not obliged to reduce emissions dur-
ing the commitment period.
In 2005 the KP was ratified by the Russian Fede-
ration, whose emissions accounted for 17.4 percent
of 1990 CO2 emissions.The Russian Federation’s rat-
ification implied that the KP came into effect as all
requirements were thus met.5 Specifically, effectua-
tion required that the KP should be ratified by at
least 55 states and that the industrialized countries
which had ratified should account for at least 55 per-
cent of CO2 emitted by themselves in 1990.
To reduce the overall abatement costs, the KP con-
tains the following cost mitigation mechanisms:
• The Bubble, which allows groups of countries to
jointly meet their obligations. This mechanism
was especially created for the EU so that it could
negotiate as a single party, while providing possi-
bilities to differentiate the targets among its
member states.
• Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Both mecha-
nisms are project-based. Particularly, they open
the possibility that a country meets treaty obliga-
tions via an abatement project in another country
(i.e. the project brings in credits for the donor
country). JI is the mechanism for projects in
Annex I countries while CDM is the mechanism
for projects in Non-Annex I countries.
• International Emissions Trading (IET), which is a
transfer of GHG quotas among Annex I countries.
1 I am deeply indebted to Rudiger Pethig for his comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 This section is based on Larson et al. (2008) and van Kooten and
Folmer (2004).
3 The main GHGs that the KP seeks to control are carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrogen oxide, hydrofluoro-carbons, perfluorocarbons
and sulphur hexafluoride (van Kooten and Sohngren 2007).
4 The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment
Program in response to the concerns about GHG emissions.
5 Up to February 2009, 181 countries had signed the KP.The United
States withdrew its support in 2006. The United States considered
JI and CDM insufficiently flexible and the role for its terrestrial
carbon sinks inadequate in meeting its KP targets.
JI, CDM and IET allow countries to meet their
obligations via reductions abroad. Although these
mechanisms make it possible to increase efficiency,
several NGOs amongst others saw them as escapes
for those countries who do not wish to reduce emis-
sions domestically (Ringius 1998). Another objec-
tion was that abatement abroad might slow down
technological innovation in Annex I countries
because of less domestic pressure. In order to meet
this criticism Annex I countries were obliged to meet
at least 50 percent of their abatement obligations
domestically.
In addition to these objections, the KP and its flexi-
ble mechanisms suffer from several other weakness-
es and pitfalls:
• The KP is not legally binding, while the penalty
for non-compliance is basically ineffectual.6
• JI and CDM credits emanate from reductions rel-
ative to a hypothetical baseline of emissions that
would have occurred absent the JI or CDM
investment. Estimating a counter-factual implies
economic and engineering problems.
• CDM projects can be substituted for develop-
ment aid.
• For some countries, particularly the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, their quotas were high-
er than their expected emissions in the commit-
ment period, which would make it possible for
them to sell quotas without the need to reduce
emissions.7
In spite of all the above-mentioned weaknesses and
pitfalls as well as the fact that most countries will not
meet their reduction targets during Phase I of the
KP, substantial experience has been made with
respect to GHG abatement and emission trading
which serves as input to post-KP negotiations.
EU emissions trading
The EU emissions trading mechanism is a two-stage
system. At the first stage, the EU negotiates as a sin-
gle party at the KP level; at the second stage the EU
differentiates its total obligation among the member
states in a burden sharing agreement resulting in a
National Allocation Plan (NAP). The domestic EU
trading scheme for CO2 emissions has been thus far
restricted to the sectors electric power generation
(installations greater than 20 megawatts only), iron
and steel, pulp, paper and board and minerals
(cement, glass, ceramics, oil refineries) in the EU27
plus, as of 2008, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
The total number of emitters subject to the trading
scheme is approximately 11,000; they account for
about 40 percent of the EU’s GHG emissions. In
2008 the European Commission (EC) proposed
extending emissions trading to other sectors includ-
ing the airline industry, and to other GHGs including
nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons.
At the national level, emitters obtain an initial
endowment of permits via grandfathering (i.e. for
free). The endowment is based on expected emis-
sions, which in their turn are based on historical per-
formance. A small proportion of the permits can be
auctioned off by the national governments. The
scheme is a cap on emissions.At the end of each year
regulated emitters must surrender allowances equiv-
alent to their emissions. Short-falls of actual emis-
sions relative to grandfathered permits need to be
matched through purchases. NAPs are subject to EC
oversight. Particularly, the EC oversees whether or
not the NAPs are consistent with KP and national
abatement obligations.
The EU trading scheme suffers from several weak-
nesses. Particularly, the two-stage design of regula-
tion (member state level implementation and EC
oversight), have created inefficiencies, regulatory
uncertainties and delays. To overcome these weak-
nesses the EC launched a proposal in 2008 which
replaces the NAPs by an EU-wide cap based on har-
monized rules under an EU authority. Moreover, in
response to the price collapse in April 2006, which
was due to an over-allocation of permits in Phase I as
a consequence of, amongst others, allocation of per-
mits on the basis of emission projections instead of
verified emission data (Alberola et al. 2008) and
grandfathering (see e.g. Neuhoff et al. 2006), the EC
in January 2008 launched a proposal to auction at
least 60 percent of the permits.
In 2007 the European Council agreed on a unilater-
al cut of 20 percent in GHG emissions by 2020 rela-
tive to 1990 levels. Moreover, it endorsed a 30 per-
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problem. It is a consequence of the absence of an institution with
the jurisdiction to enforce environmental policy internationally. It
implies that international (environmental) cooperation must be
based on consent. Consequently, there is a risk of free-riding.
Moreover, a policy that has been agreed upon may be foiled.
Several mechanisms have been developed to induce countries to
cooperate and to comply to concluded agreements – see Folmer et
al. (1993) and Folmer and van Mouche (2000).
7 This has become known as trade in “hot air”. Woerdman (2002)
discusses various options to limiting trading in hot air such as rene-
gotiating targets, transaction taxes and quantitative restrictions.
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cent cut if other developed countries committed to
comparable reductions, and India, China, Brazil and
other more advanced developing countries con-
tributed adequately according to their responsibili-
ties and capabilities. Although these intentions are
vague and contingent upon the responses of other
countries, they are major initiatives that are likely to
have a positive impact on post-Kyoto negotiations.
Another major EU initiative was launched in
January 2008. It amounts to the proposal to develop
a world-wide emissions trading scheme. Such a sys-
tem would eliminate several weaknesses of the pre-
sent flexible mechanisms and contribute to a more
effective and efficient global warming policy.
OPEC versus Kyoto?
Is OPEC going to suffer when Kyoto wins, or vice
versa? To answer this question I start by briefly
describing OPEC, its mission and market power. The
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) is an intergovernmental organization of
twelve oil producing and oil exporting countries. It’s
mission is to coordinate and unify the petroleum
policies of its member states so as to ensure them a
steady income but also to secure an efficient, eco-
nomic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers
(http://www.opec.org).
In 2007 world oil production was 73.27 million bar-
rels per day of which approximately 45 percent was
produced by OPEC, 25 percent by OECD countries
(particularly the United States, Mexico, Canada and
Norway) and 10 percent by Russia (IEA 2008).
More than 75 percent of world oil reserves are locat-
ed in the OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia currently is
the largest oil producer in the world. Moreover, it
possesses approximately 20 percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves (EIA 2007b). Its relatively low
production costs and accessibility has enabled Saudi
Arabia to boost output quickly and to operate as the
swing producer of the world (EIA 2007a). Kaul and
Subramanian (2005) show that when oil prices tend
to fall Saudi Arabia reduces output, while it increas-
es output to prevent substantial price hikes, as during
the Gulf War.
By means of a multi-equation dynamic econometric
model based on monthly data, Hansen and Lindholt
(2008) show that for the period 1973–2001 producers
outside OPEC can be characterised as competitive
producers but that OPEC members cannot be con-
sidered as price-takers. Kingma and Suyker (2007)
stress OPEC’s institutional instability suggesting
that its member countries often produce more than
agreed upon. The excess production has frequently
been compensated by Saudi Arabia by lowering pro-
duction.
OPEC’s position relative to the KP is ambiguous.
On the one hand, all major OPEC countries, except
Iraq, are signatories and thus formally support the
KP. However, the KP also implies partial expropria-
tion for OPEC countries because taxes on oil levied
by oil consuming countries raise the consumer price
above the OPEC supply price. The expropriation
likely explains OPEC’s opposition to plans to
reduce oil consumption and its criticisms of the sub-
sidies that industrial countries offer to stimulate
renewable energy resources. It may also have
induced OPEC Secretary General’s comments on
the sidelines of the International Oil Summit in
Paris8 that oil is not responsible for climate change
but that it is the industrialized countries that are
responsible and his plea that the revenues from high
taxes on oil products should be invested in environ-
mental projects, particularly adaptation to climate
change. On the basis of a review of the literature
Barnett et al. (2003) provide evidence that OPEC
will indeed incur losses from the working of the KP.
However, the losses will not affect OPEC countries
equally nor will the losses be as large as some mod-
els predict.
The possible losses that OPEC countries may incur
have triggered a debate on the green paradox (Sinn
2008). This paradox is based on the assumption that
suppliers of oil feel threatened by a decline of future
prices due to gradual reduction of oil consumption
in abating countries. If this reduction reduces the
discounted value of the oil price in the future more
than at present, the oil producing countries will
expand production in the short run which will
increase oil consumption and thus accelerate global
warming.
Eichner and Pethig (2009) analyze the green para-
dox in a two-period, three-country general equilibri-
um model with profit maximizing suppliers of oil.
One country supplies oil and the other two consume
it. One of the oil consuming countries tightens its
emissions cap in the first or in the second period.
They find that tightening the second period cap does
8 Reuters, 02.04.2009.
not necessarily lead to the green paradox. It may
occur if it does not result from tightening the cap in
the first period.
Even in the case oil producers do not increase pro-
duction there may be a perverse effect in the form of
carbon leakage. The basic idea is that a CO2 reduc-
tion policy in the home country will raise domestic
energy costs which will bring a comparative advan-
tage to firms in non-abating countries. Moreover, it
may induce firms to migrate from the home country
to non-abating countries (environmental capital
flight). Both carbon leakage and environmental cap-
ital flight will lead to an expansion of production in
non-abating countries and thus offset some of the
abatement in the home country.
Eichner and Pethig (2009) show in their two-period
three-country general equilibrium model that car-
bon leakage does not necessarily occur and that if it
occurs the extent depends on the interaction of vari-
ous parameters and elasticities. Regarding environ-
mental capital flight, Jeppesen and Folmer (2001)
argue that a firm’s response to the introduction or
tightening of an environmental policy handle, such
as the introduction of a cap on CO2 emissions, needs
to be evaluated in the context of the entire set of
location factors including the quality of the labour
market, public policy, access to suppliers and con-
sumers, and cultural and social aspects. Particularly
relocation is a rational response to environmental
policy if the difference between discounted costs
associated with compliance with the environmental
policy outweighs the discounted sum of the differ-
ence in costs and benefits of all other location factors
at both locations, plus relocation costs. In a meta-
analysis Jeppesen et al. (2002) find that methodolog-
ical considerations play a critical role in shaping the
body of received estimates. Finally, van der Veen et
al. (2001) finds no support for environmental capital
flight in the Netherlands.9
One of the basic assumptions underlying the green
paradox is that oil producing countries fear a decline
of future prices due to gradual reduction of oil con-
sumption in abating countries. Support for this
assumption can be derived from the decreasing oil
intensity of production (i.e. total primary use of oil
per unit of output). OECD (2004) shows that due to
the more efficient use of oil, increasing utilisation of
alternative energy sources and a shift in the compo-
sition of output towards less oil intensive sectors, oil
intensity of production has steadily declined in
OECD countries by slightly less than 50 percent
over the period 1970–2003. In developing countries
it increased by slightly less than 30 percent until 2000
when it started marginally declining. However, the
decrease in oil intensity of production has been nul-
lified by the increase in volume of output, as reflect-
ed by, amongst others, the development of the spot
price of crude oil. The spot price increased by
approximately 257 percent from a S&P GSCI Crude
Oil Spot Price Index of 147.4 in the first quarter of
2000 to an unprecedented level of 526.0 in the last
quarter of 2007. Moreover, although global crude oil
production has increased from 68,490 barrels per
day in 2000 to approximately 73,270 in 2007 (7 per-
cent), the contribution of oil to the world’s energy
supply has decreased. Particularly, IEA (2007) shows
that due to shrinking oil reserves in politically stable
and easily accessible regions and limited investments
in production capacity, the share of oil in the world’s
total energy supply has declined from 46.2 percent of
6,128 million tons of oil equivalents (Mtoe) in 1973
to 35 percent of 11,435 Mtoe in 2005. A third factor
that runs contrary to the green paradox is the
increased demand in developing countries, particu-
larly India and China, which compensates or exceeds
the possible gradual reduction of oil consumption in
abating countries.
The increases in oil prices to unprecedented levels
have triggered the substitution away from oil.
Specifically, it has encouraged the use of alternative
energy sources and further stimulated research and
development of fuel efficiency and of utilisation of
more ecologically-friendly alternatives, particular
wind, solar and bio-fuels. However, the substitution
away from oil need not necessarily be beneficial to
the environment nor lead to net social benefits. First,
not only ecologically-friendly alternatives have been
substituted for oil; the use of nuclear and coal-based
energy has also increased lately, especially in coal
abundant China. Secondly, several alternatives may
be ecologically friendly in terms of CO2 emissions
but nevertheless have other negative (environmen-
tal) impacts. For instance, first generation biomass
production (e.g. ethanol and bio-diesel) may lead to,
amongst others, reductions in soil fertility, leave less
water for food crop production, aggravate soil ero-
sion, negatively affect biodiversity and compete with
food production resulting in higher food prices
(Lundgren et al. 2008). Moreover, it is not clear
whether the use of bio-fuels really results in lower
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GHG emissions because of the increased use of N-
fertilizer which can contribute as much or more to
global warming than the reduction achieved via fos-
sil fuel saving (Crutzen et al. 2008). Overall,
Lundgren et al. (2008) concludes that converting
from non-renewable fossil fuels to bio-fuels does not
necessarily lead to net positive welfare effects.
Thirdly, several ecologically-friendly alternatives,
particularly solar, are still at an early stage of devel-
opment and unable to compensate large scale reduc-
tions in the use of fossil fuels in the short run.
Kyoto is also influenced by the business cycle.
During the present recession the consumption of
fossil fuels has substantially decreased, as reflected
by the price fall of a barrel of oil from its peak of
146.08 US dollars in the first half of 2008 to approx-
imately 50 US dollars early 2009.10 The price drop
reduces the incentives to substitute away from oil.
Moreover, together with increasing public deficits
and declining profits in the private sector it may dis-
courage development and large scale introduction of
alternative types of energy including low-carbon. For
instance, the Australian government recently decid-
ed to postpone the introduction of CO2 emission
trading for at least one year, although it announced
that it is still committed to the long-term CO2 emis-
sion reduction.11 The upshot is that both high and
low prices of fossil fuels should be supported by
accompanying policies, e.g. subsidies on research and
development, to foster energy transition.
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PANEL
The European Editor of The Economist, John Peet,
panel chairman, expressed the hope that the role of
coal could be discussed, especially since one of the
panel members comes from a coal-rich country,
Poland.
10 In response to expectations that the recession has reached its
peak, it has slightly started increasing (Reuters, 04.05.2009).
11 Reuters, 07.05.2009.
Energy expert Claudia Kemfert, German Institute
for Economic Research (DIW), pointed to the prob-
lem of oil supply scarcity if investment in production
is postponed because of the economic crisis. Since
global oil demand will increase, we will need this
investment to develop new oil fields. “The oil
demand increase by fast growing countries will over-
compensate the demand decline by the OECD coun-
tries leading to increasing, not falling prices”. The
growing scarcity of oil makes substitution necessary
and at the same time we need to substitute coal
because of climate change. To prevent environmen-
tal capital flight, we need a global climate agreement
on an emissions trading system. But we also need
technological breakthroughs to achieve CO2-free,
safe and affordable energy, and implementing new
technologies requires time and money.
Janusz Reiter is the Polish ambassador-at-large for
climate change, whose expertise lies in reconciling
diverging interests. “Although we are united in our
vision of a low-carbon economy, we are not agreed
on how this can be achieved”. Some oil producing
countries fear that they may be marginalised in the
climate change debate and these concerns must be
addressed. “In Copenhagen, we must strive to
achieve a deal that is considered to be fair by all
countries”. But the Middle Eastern countries are
also very influential in the G27 and in China, which
is why it is important that they back a Copenhagen
agreement. With regard to coal, it is democratically
distributed throughout the world, and abandoning
coal is not an option for all the countries that depend
on it. He believes that carbon capture and sequester-
ing (CCS) will be a viable process, as businesses are
already investing in this technology. In Poland, for
example, 94 percent of power generation comes
from coal, a reality that cannot be denied but that
must be shaped. Nevertheless, Poland should be able
to reach the EU’s 20/20 target by 2020. The EU can
be proud of its Climate Control Package because it
accommodates the needs of its diverse members.
Now it is important for the EU and the United
States to reach out to the Chinese and get them
involved in a Copenhagen agreement. Russia, as an
oil producing and coal burning country, has taken a
status-quo position on climate change, although
Putin has recently addressed the problem. We need
Russia’s support, otherwise a deal in Copenhagen
could be blocked.
The last speaker was Tom Burke, an adviser to the
British government on climate change. The shared
dilemma of all countries today is that to prosper we
need a growing amount of energy but if we continue
to use energy the way we do today we “will compro-
mise the very prosperity we are using the energy to
achieve”. How can we deliver both energy security
and climate security? Although technologies for
achieving a low carbon economy are available or
within reach, we are lagging in deploying these tech-
nologies. To achieve a low carbon economy we need
to emphasise not the pain this will involve but “the
opportunities for innovation and efficiency that
improve productivity and competitiveness”. The
needed political action is hindered by the question of
the costs, and these will be of the same order as
required for the bank rescue packages. But the cost
of failing to resolve the dilemma will be even higher,
and since all will benefit, all must pay, either in the
form of emissions trading or a carbon tax. It is essen-
tial that governments use this additional revenue to
promote low-carbon technologies and not to consol-
idate the public finances after the bank rescues.
The ensuing discussion looked at the role of OPEC
in the climate change discussion.Will OPEC lose out
in the transition to a low carbon economy?
Mohamed Bin Dhaen Al Hamli stressed that oil, as
part of the energy mix, will still be needed 50 years
from now. The oil producers in his region have
signed the Kyoto Protocol and should not be dis-
criminated against; they need the income from oil to
catch up with the rest of the world.
The discussion then turned to the price of oil and how
it is determined.Tom Burke observed that the failure
to invest in the oil industry contributed to a spike in
prices. Oil production is not going to exceed 80 to 90
million barrels a day no matter what happens to
demand. This implies rapidly rising prices. According
to Claudia Kemfert, a price of oil above 80 to 90 dol-
lars a barrel is needed to finance exploration, which
has grown increasingly more expensive. Because of
the scarcity factor, the oil price will not fall to a large
extent. Henk Folmer agreed and argued that the
expectation of lower future oil prices is false because
oil production cannot keep up with demand.
Frederick van der Ploeg mentioned an overlooked
statistic: an increase in known oil reserves. Folmer
cautioned, however, that the growth of new finds is
slowing and that these finds are often difficult to
access or are in politically instable regions.
Does OPEC set the price of oil? Al Hamli argued
that the price is set by market forces. The oil produc-
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ers, in dialogue with consumers, try to determine
how much oil is needed so that their expensive pro-
duction capacities can be adjusted accordingly. Oil
production has not been cut in the current crisis, on
the optimistic assumption that the world economies
will soon recover. Ali Obaid Al Yabhouni added that
the price of oil, like other commodities, is influenced
by the flow of supply, which can vary for technical
reasons; by market fundamentals such as demand
and inventories; by natural causes that can interrupt
supply; by taxation, regulation and policies; and also
by statements of politicians. OPEC’s role should be
seen as that of a central bank, intervening to regulate
and balance the market and implementing policies
that contribute to economic growth.
Ottmar Edenhofer agreed with Hans-Werner Sinn
that the supply side has been underestimated, but in
taking this into account we must look at the interde-
pendency of the oil, gas and coal markets. A high oil
price makes coal attractive as a substitute, which
leads to higher CO2 emissions. Michael Hoel
stressed that coal is the key issue in climate change
because of its great supply. Lady Barbara Judge
added that coal is cheap, democratic and widely dis-
tributed. We need the same efforts for developing
renewables applied to cleaning up coal. Tom Burke
questioned whether coal can be made “clean” but at
least we should strive to make its use carbon neutral.
This can be achieved by CCS, for which huge invest-
ments will be needed. Claudia Kemfert added that
public acceptance of CCS technology must also be
worked for. Janusz Reiter stressed that coal has a
future and that since coal reserves are distributed
throughout the world, we can expect to have scale
effects from the new CCS technology. The advance-
ment of this technology is all the more urgent, in
Claudia Kemfert’s opinion, since coal may be subject
to a green paradox: producers fearing a fall in future
prices may extract more today, leading to higher car-
bon emissions.
